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ABSTRACT. This paper provides a critical analysis of the post-2015 global develop- 
ment agenda that the international community plans to adopt. This agenda, produced 
by a high-level panel of eminent persons, is based on two previous agendas – the 
MDGs and the SDGs. This merger is motivated by similarities in their goals, inter- 
dependence between some of their goals, and the need for improved global governance, 
especially with respect to global public goods. However both agendas are ill-defined 
and a gap exists between ends and means. The new unique agenda has numerous and 
varied goals which are potentially in conflict. Furthermore, the world has changed a 
lot since 2000 and this necessitates a change in the global development agenda. 
Globally there have been growing economic and social inequalities, considerable 
population growth and the rise of emerging economies. Subjects of increasing concern 
include climate change, and other environmental and sustainability issues. These 
need to be given greater attention in any new economic and/or political agenda than 
previously. It is argued that developed countries might face a dilemma between 
altruistic aid policies and tied aid to encourage transformation towards a green 
economy. Despite its shortcomings, it can be argued that the new agenda provides 
scope for political compromise and flexibility. This is rational if a wide view of 
rationality is adopted. 
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Introduction 
 
The Millennium Development Goals (which have for more than a decade 
provided global direction of aid and which were adopted by the UN in 2000) 
are due to expire as objectives in 2015. Despite several limitations (Tisdell, 
2007), these goals provided a rational framework for the global allocation of 
foreign aid but this development agenda must now be updated. Because the 
global situation has changed since 2000 in several ways identified in this 
article, there is an opportunity in drawing up the post-2015 agenda to take 
account of these changes, adjust priorities and redefine goals. This article out- 
lines the process involved in drawing up the post-2015 global development 
agenda, considers whether there should be one such overreaching agenda 
rather than two major ones as at present, and examines the heterogeneous 
views and objectives that need to be accommodated in drawing up the new 
agenda. In addition, we identify several limitations of the proposed post-2015 
agenda, such as the difficulty of obtaining a workable definition of sustain- 
able development, the consistency of its objectives, the fact that its proposed 
ends do not seem to be well related to available means, and the presence of 
some vagueness in the statement of its objectives. However, we point out that 
the latter is probably needed to achieve political compromises and to achieve 
some flexibility in decision-making. Its formulation could be regarded as 
rational within this broad context. There are few published assessments of 
the proposed post-2015 agenda. They include those by Hulme et al. (2015), 
Vandemoortele and Delamonica (2010) and Vandemoortele (2014). This 
article makes a significant contribution by adding to the scholarly literature 
on this subject.  
In July 2012, the Secretary General of UN tasked a high-level panel of 
eminent persons with producing a proposal for what could be the post-2015 
development agenda. This will set the international community’s development 
agenda until 2030. There is an emerging consensus that, to be relevant, the 
post-2015 development agenda needs to go well beyond a poverty focus (the 
main focus of the Millennium Development Goals), given the dramatic 
changes in the international development landscape over the past two 
decades (Vandermoortele and Delamonica, 2010; Vandermoortele, 2014). In 
1990, almost half of the population in developing regions lived on less than 
$1.25 a day. It is claimed (United Nations, 2014) that this rate dropped to 22 
per cent by 2010, reducing the number of people living in extreme poverty 
by 700 million. However, income distribution and relative poverty need to be 
carefully considered (OECD, 2013). Indeed, many of those who have escaped 
extreme poverty in the developing world are still poor, remain vulnerable 
and lack safety nets to cope with shocks. Moreover, concerns are mounting 
about the impact of greater inequality within developed, emerging and 
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developing economies on growth, social cohesion and political stability. On 
the environmental front, the consequences of climate change are becoming 
more acute with each passing year. In addition, natural and man-made 
disasters in recent years have brought the issue of disaster-risk reduction and 
resilience to the forefront of the development discourse. Therefore, the future 
development and sustainability goals in the post-2015 agenda are intended to 
encompass economic, environmental, and social dimensions and be applicable 
to all countries. In this way, they will unite the common interests of the 
prosperous, emerging and poor countries across the globe. 
The proposal for a post-2015 development agenda has been available since 
May 2013 (United Nations, 2013) and is now being seriously considered by 
the international community for adoption before the expiry of the MDGs 
(Millennium Development Goals). This future unique agenda can be con- 
sidered to be, to some extent, a merger of two existing agendas, namely the 
MDGs on the one hand and the Rio+20 process or SDGs (Sustainable 
Development Goals) on the other. 
The MDGs were adopted by the UN in 2000 (United Nations, 2000). The 
eight MDGs range from halving extreme poverty rates to halting the spread 
of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education. Its goals 1 to 7 are 
directly about human and economic development in LDCs. Its goal 8 concerns 
all countries and more specifically the developed ones since it promotes the 
implementation of a global partnership for development. The goal 7 is about 
ensuring environmental sustainability; its presence shows that in 2000, the 
connection between the development of LDCs and sustainable development 
was already clearly established. Therefore, the future unique agenda can be 
seen as a step forward in further taking into account this connection.  
During the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, governments agreed to launch a 
UN-led process to create a set of universal SDGs based on an international 
framework. It was envisaged that these would enable countries to better target 
and monitor progress across all three dimensions of sustainable development 
(social, environmental, and economic) in a coordinated and holistic way 
(UNCSD, 2012).  
Both processes, post-MDGs and SDGs, have poverty eradication within 
the context of sustainable development as their primary objective, with the 
aim of using a global goal framework to achieve this. Therefore, the view 
developed that these two governance processes could be combined to create 
one set of goals for the post-2015 development agenda. As a result, the high-
level panel of eminent persons (denoted HLP in the following; its com- 
position is available from UN, 2013: 66–68) recommended a transformation 
to end poverty through sustainable development. It outlines five transforma- 
tional shifts, applicable to both developed and developing countries alike, 
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including a new Global Partnership as the basis for a single, universal post-
2015 agenda. These five transformational shifts are: 
-leave no one behind, 
-put sustainable development at the core, 
-transform economies for jobs and inclusive growth, 
-build peace and effective, open and accountable public institutions, and 
-forge a new global partnership. 
 
The first four shifts are where the focus for action is mostly at the country 
level, while the fifth transformative shift, forging a new global partnership, is 
an overarching change in international cooperation that provides the policy 
space for domestic transformations. These five shifts are considered as 
priorities by the HLP. However, to be more specific, the HLP has proposed 
12 possible goals: (i) end poverty; (ii) empower girls and women and achieve 
gender equality; (iii) provide quality education and lifelong learning; (iv) 
ensure healthy lives; (v) ensure food security and good nutrition; (vi) achieve 
universal access to water and sanitation; (vii) secure sustainable energy; 
(viii) create jobs, sustainable livelihoods and equitable growth; (ix) manage 
natural resource assets sustainably; (x) ensure good governance and effective 
institutions; (xi) ensure stable and peaceful societies; and (xii) create a global 
enabling environment and catalyze long-term finance. In addition to these 12 
goals, 54 national targets have also been defined (United Nations, 2013, 
Annex 1).  
It should be noted that since the HLP produced its report in 2013, many 
actors, such as the OECD, have highlighted some weaknesses in it. Thus, 
these actors1 have produced more recent recommendations which nevertheless 
adopt the same2 approach as that proposed by the HLP.  
Since the establishment of the MDGs, times have changed. The process 
of the shifting distribution of wealth has altered the way we think about the 
issues and the measurement of poverty reduction, social development and 
progress more broadly. The last decade has witnessed a rapid convergence in 
countries’ per capita income as parts of the developing world, especially 
because China and India grew faster than the advanced economies of the 
OECD. This growth and increasing heterogeneity within the developing world 
makes the so-called North-South division an outdated concept. Nevertheless, 
large disparities persist in standards of living, and worries still continue 
about the sustainability and environmental costs of economic growth. It is 
therefore the purpose of this paper to critically analyze the post-2015 global 
development agenda in relation to this recent evolution of aid policy and the 
challenges associated with it. 
The paper is organized as follows. The genesis of the post-2015 global 
development agenda is briefly presented in Section 1. Section 2 highlights 
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the objectives and the underlying motives of the MDGs. Section 3 is devoted 
to the SDGs and their related problems of definition and of responsibility. 
Section 4 presents the shortcomings that are common to both current agendas. 
Section 5 reviews possible problems that will be encountered by the future 
unique agenda, such as coordination failure, lack of aid effectiveness and the 
increased tied aid. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. The Genesis: One World – One Agenda 
 
Many different reasons favor the adoption of a single agenda. Hence the 
advocacy is “one world-one agenda.” Indeed, such a claim results from the 
two long-term main tendencies that have dominated the twentieth century. 
On the one hand, there is economic globalization. It is a process that has 
been intensified over time by means of different flows at the international 
level, such as financial flows, trade of goods and services and human migra- 
tions. One of the main consequences of this intensified process of economic 
globalization has been an increasing interdependency among stakeholders 
(such as nations-states, companies) and markets. Given this interdependence, 
it is nowadays impossible to imagine any country – especially a developing 
one – trying by itself to create economic growth and develop. Any national 
economic policy must take into account the huge influence of economic 
globalization. On the other hand, the twentieth century has seen the largest 
population increase ever experienced by humankind. There were approximately 
2 billion people at the beginning of the twentieth century and 7 billion at its 
end. By the middle of this century, the global population may reach about 9 
billion. This demographic increase has put more pressure on economies and 
on the environment. Indeed, it is a great challenge for humanity to feed and to 
get jobs and incomes for everyone (Sumner and Tiwari, 2009). This chal- 
lenge is moreover reinforced by the growing pressure increasing population 
is putting on natural resources and which is resulting in environmental 
degradation (Griggs et al., 2013). 
It is therefore obvious that both agendas, MDGs and SDGs, need to be 
linked. Indeed, many examples demonstrate the interconnection between them. 
People are fed by agriculture but agriculture depends on ecosystems (Tisdell, 
2015). Similarly, water quality is central in any ecosystem and it is, at the 
same time, important for the eradication of poverty since it prevents various 
diseases. What the previous examples show, is that many challenges are 
common to both agendas and are global challenges. In fact, many examples, 
if not most, have the character of global or international public goods 
(GPGs) (Kaul et al., 2003); they transcend national borders and often affect 
all, or at least a multitude of countries. In other words, the existence of GPGs 
can be considered to be a key for framing the post-2015 development agenda 
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(Kaul, 2013). Examples of GPG-type policy issues are global climate stabil- 
ity, international financial stability, communicable disease control, peace and 
security, the institutional architecture of international trade and finance, 
global communication and transportation systems, and the fulfillment of 
global norms such as basic human rights.  
The study of GPGs raises a question common to both agendas and central 
for each one,3 namely identifying the governance requirements posed by global 
challenges. The eradication of poverty needs to tackle the central problem of 
better governance at the world level, especially among donors’ countries to 
avoid fragmentation of their action and coordination failures. Better gover- 
nance is also needed at the world level to tackle environmental degradation. 
Since there is one world, improving its governance seems to require a single 
agenda. 
 
2. Aid Policy: Heterogeneous Objectives and Underlying Motives 
 
There is a huge volume of literature about aid policy: some scholars (e.g. 
Easterly, 2001; 2006) claim that aid has done more harm than good, and 
others (e.g. Sachs, 2005) project a positive view of aid policy. 
 
Heterogeneous Agendas and Motives 
The nature of official overseas aid is heterogeneous. There is global multi- 
lateral aid, nation to nation aid, and from particular nations to groups of 
nations, and from groups of nations (such as the EU) to individual nations and 
groups of nations. All this aid is not necessarily driven by the same agenda 
or motives. Although unilateral government aid is claimed to be altruistic, it 
is not always so. In fact, much of it is based on self-interest. For example, 
aid to some Pacific Island countries is intended to act as an incentive to 
allow favorable access of the donor country to their natural resources (such 
as tuna, forests and minerals). Aid is also given by some donors “to buy” 
votes on international bodies from recipient countries. For example, China 
and Taiwan provide aid to selected countries to facilitate resource-access. 
Japan is supposed to buy votes on the International Whaling Commission by 
giving overseas aid (and possibly by giving bribes) (Drezner, 2001). There- 
fore altruism is clearly not a strong motive in all cases.  
Furthermore, individual countries or groups give aid to selected LDCs to 
prevent other countries increasing their political influence on them. Australian, 
French, New Zealand and US aid in the Pacific counters the possible influ- 
ence of China, Japan and so on.  
Another controversial matter is to what extent do countries use aid pro- 
grams as a cover for spying4 or for collecting useful information about host 
countries? Aid may also be given in an attempt to stem “illegal” migrants 
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from LDCs, either environmental refugees or economic ones. Given how 
closely located Papua New Guinea (PNG) is to Australia, the latter has an 
interest in stemming contagious diseases in PNG. There are, for example, 
concerns that if Ebola should reach the Pacific islands that it will increase 
the risk of its occurrence in Australia. For similar reasons, i.e. because “the 
introduction or spread of the disease would pose an imminent and severe risk 
to public health in Canada” (Declaration of the Canadian immigration author- 
ities), Canada on October 31, 2014 stopped issuing visas to people from the 
West African countries at the heart of the Ebola outbreak; Australia did it 
earlier in October. Other emerging contagious diseases raise similar issues 
involving regionally relevant public bads. 
A donor country also has an interest in the political stability of its near 
neighbors. In fact, some aid may be given to promote political stability of 
receiving countries out of self interest of donors, regardless whether these 
receiving countries are important trading partners or not. The provision of 
global pure public goods can also be a motive for aid; regional public goods 
are also relevant, for example, environmental spillovers from neighboring 
countries. However, the production of public goods (either global or regional) 
is subject to free riding (see Section 5). 
Even “emerging” countries like South Korea, (one of the few countries 
which have successfully transitioned from a recipient to a donor in the last 
two decades) are experiencing conflicts between altruism and self-interest 
(Chun et al., 2010). Indeed Korea’s ODA displays a low ODA/GNI ratio, a 
high percentage of concessional loans compared to grants, a high portion of 
tied aid, regional bias, and a relatively large number of recipients. 
Most multilateral actors – e.g. the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) and the European Commission (EC) – have other interests beyond 
development effectiveness. The EC is concerned with projecting a common 
European vision in international development and increasing the visibility of 
the European Union in international affairs, while the DAC tries to protect 
its role and relevance in the field of international development. 
     Varied stakeholders influence foreign aid. Domestic political pressure 
groups favoring increased overseas aid constitute influences. Some may be 
altruistic but many also have a self-interested motive because they obtain 
economic or social benefits from such programs. The existence of such groups 
leads to several queries: who are their main clients, how does political 
lobbying affect the agenda of global public bureaucrats and how do they 
exert their influence? Many NGOs are in this situation, and also domestic 
public servants involved in the distribution of foreign aid have an interest in 
its maintenance. Indeed, one may ask to what extent do bureaucracies in- 
volved in aid promote “desirable” goals by acting in their self interest? If it is 
true, as pointed out by Adam Smith, that self interest can be compatible with 
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the pursuance of desirable goals, this may or may not apply to ODA. 
Moreover, it seems that altruism often evolves to a form of self-interest or 
exists together with some amount of self-interest.  
 
Tied Aid 
Since its creation in 1961, the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
has worked to improve the effectiveness of its members’ aid efforts. One 
major issue has been whether aid should be freely available to buy goods and 
services from all countries (“untied aid”), or whether aid should be restricted 
to the procurement of goods and services from the donor country (“tied 
aid”). Tying aid is condemned by DAC because evidence has shown that it 
increases the costs of a development project by as much as 15–30%. In 
addition, the administration of tied aid requires larger bureaucracies in both 
the donor and recipient countries. Untied aid avoids these unnecessary costs 
by giving recipient countries the freedom to use their aid to procure goods 
and services from virtually any country. Despite its efforts to accelerate the 
untying of aid by monitoring progress and offering guidance and recommen- 
dations, the OECD (2009) recognized in its 2009 review that:5 “Good 
progress is being made in untying aid in general and in reporting on the tying 
status of aid. 79% of all ODA is now untied, 17% is still tied and the tying 
status of only 4% of aid is not reported.” In fact, many OECD countries face 
a dilemma because East Asian countries focus on tied aid. China, for example 
sends Chinese to developing countries to complete infrastructure projects 
with most of the equipment and so on coming from China. The locals gain 
extra infrastructure but possibly little else. Tied aid results in imperfect com- 
petition among donors’ countries since it can be viewed as a subsidy given 
by the donor country in order to promote its exports. This feeling about tied 
aid is reinforced by the fact that secrecy surrounds the aid agreements of many 
East Asian countries with LDCs. 
Although direct overseas aid (which is not multilateral) may not be tied, 
many of the economic benefits are still obtained by citizens of the donor 
countries. They gain by way of consultancies, from on-the-ground assistance 
to LDCs, and appropriate a large part of the aid funds for their adminis- 
tration. As pointed out by Milner and Tingley (2010, p. 204): “many studies 
of economic aid point out that domestic interests within donor countries 
seem to have a significant impact on how much and where aid is delivered, 
as domestic groups presumptively gain from these flows.” Similarly, Alesina 
and Dollar (2000) found considerable evidence that the direction of foreign 
aid is dictated by political and strategic considerations and that colonial past 
and political alliances are the major determinants of foreign aid. Economic 
needs and policy performance of the recipients’ countries are only second-
order determinants. Furthermore, economic stagnation, increased unemploy- 
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ment and mounting public sector debt in most OECD countries are putting 
governments under increasing public pressure to reduce ODA budgets and to 
use ODA in more explicit pursuit of their own economic and political in- 
terests. Kawai and Takagi (2004) have illustrated this situation for the case 
of Japan’s ODA. 
 
An Incomplete Agenda 
Many criticisms have been made of the MDGs. It has been claimed that they 
constitute an incomplete agenda. They are entirely concerned with develop- 
ment and poverty eradication. MDG 1–6 aim to achieve a basic level of 
income, education, gender equality and health but are only partially concerned 
with protecting our common environment. While some attention is paid to 
environmental sustainability (MDG 7), not enough is given to the economic 
and social dimensions of sustainable development. Moreover, some topics 
are completely left out such as peace, security and disarmament as well as 
human rights, democracy and good governance – despite the presence of 
MDG 8 for the latter. In addition, the MDGs framework overlooks inequality 
in income and access to opportunity (including access to infrastructure) and 
remains silent on how to meet basic human needs – and beyond – through 
self-sustaining growth and development (Fukuda-Parr, 2010; Martins and 
Lucci, 2013). 
 
3. Sustainable Development: Problems of Definition and Responsibility 
 
A major problem is that the agenda does not say what sustainable develop- 
ment is. There are many definitions of SD (see, for example, Tisdell, 2005, 
Ch. 11). Furthermore, if there is agreement on what constitutes sustainable 
development, opinions often differ about the ways to achieve it. Some econ- 
omists want strong limits on resource use whereas others feel that this is not 
necessary to achieve sustainable development. There are also controversies 
about the extent to which sustainable development is desirable (see, for ex- 
ample, Beckerman, 1994; Tisdell, 2015, Ch. 4). Depending on the definition 
of what constitutes desirable development, sustainable development paths are 
not always the most desirable ones. Furthermore, deciding what is the most 
desirable development path involves significant value judgments and opinions 
differ on these normative aspects. Such problems are usually not taken into 
account in global agendas. These problems of SD definition are clearly 
present in some (not most) of the 12 goals suggested by the HLP.6 Indeed, 
what does “ensuring secure sustainable energy” imply? What is “equitable 
growth”? For example, how much weight should be put on the welfare of 
future generations compared to current ones? Is it desirable to have sustain- 
able livelihoods if this results in a much reduced level of income? 
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It is possible that by following SDGs some LDCs will generate insuf- 
ficient economic growth to escape the Malthusian trap, for example, if they 
utilize their natural resources sustainably or very slowly and deplete their non-
renewable natural resources. Indeed, the DACs did not develop by adopting 
sustainable use strategies and many also drew heavily on the natural 
resources of their colonies or other countries through international trade. 
Sustainable use strategies could slow the development of LDCs and their 
ability to reduce poverty. China’s recent economic growth was not based on 
sustainable use policies. Sustainable use policies could result in continuing 
impoverishment of many LDCs. 
 
Economic Globalization and the Trail of Responsibility 
The most developed countries have been accused of exploiting the natural 
resources of developing countries. This was particularly relevant when im- 
perial (colonial) systems were in place. Today, some of the rapidly develop- 
ing LDCs seem to be exploiting the natural resources (and sometimes labor) 
of poorer LDCs. For example, China is a major exporter of furniture and 
relies to a considerable extent on imported timber from Russia, some other 
developed countries, as well as LDCs. This adds to deforestation. In 2006, 
China imported approximately two-thirds of its logs from the Russian Feder- 
ation. Papua New Guinea accounted for 6.4% and Myanmar for 3.2% (State 
Forestry Administration, 2009, p. 25). Other similar examples are available 
for most Asian countries. China and other Asian countries are repeating what 
many European countries did in the past to get economic growth but it is 
driven not by territorial imperialism but market imperialism. Several ex- 
amples are available, and the actions of the exploiting LDCs are adding to 
the unsustainability of development.  
A further twist to this scenario is that the resources taken from the 
poorest LDCs may be often put into manufactured goods that are supplied to 
more developed countries. Therefore, the trail of “responsibility” gets longer. 
Many consumers have no idea of the environmental consequences of their 
purchases, and possibly many do not care. This is a problem thrown up by 
the market system. Hayek (1948) extolled the market system arguing what 
all buyers need to know is the relative prices of commodities for this system 
to work efficiently. However, this assumes that environmental effects are in- 
significant as well as other possible social concerns about how commodities 
are supplied (Tisdell, 2011a). 
 
4. Some Weaknesses Common to Both Existing Agendas 
 
The development of global development agendas is particularly important for 
multilateral development agencies, because it provides them with a political 
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purpose. Indeed, a major concern of these agencies is their own survival and 
growth. The theory developed by Niskanen (1971) has some relevance here. 
He stated, initially considering the internal US situation, that the primary 
actors were bureaucrats and members of relevant Congressional committees. 
Bureaucrats seek to maximize objectives – income and perks – defined in 
terms of the agency’s discretionary budget – the discretionary budget is the 
difference between the budget the Congress gives an agency and the cost to 
the agency of producing its output. In other words, bureaucracy behaves like 
a monopoly firm facing a downward sloping demand curve for the quantity 
of bureaucratic services as a function of the “price.” Committee members 
maximize re-election odds; since the politicians on the committee are there 
by choice, they will tend to be interested in an inefficiently large output from 
agencies under their jurisdiction (so they are willing to give more money 
than the full Congress would, but they expect it to be used as efficiently as 
the full Congress would). As a result of this interaction, bureaucrats want an 
oversized budget. Their overseers in Congressional committees want an over- 
sized budget (relative to what the Congressional median would want). So we 
get an equilibrium. The implication for efficiency is that Congress will over-
consume its common pool resource (tax dollars), leading to a growing 
spending deficit. Hence, Niskanen’s model gave a simple explanation for 
bureaucratic inefficiency (high price relative to marginal cost) and under-
provision of services. 
Niskanen’s theory can be applied to foreign aid. The international public 
(civil) services are interested in the survival and growth of their own bureau- 
cracies. It helps to have a set of objectives or purposes because rationalism is 
the name of the game: means are needed to meet desirable ends. Therefore, 
if they can come up with a set of seemingly desirable ends, then they are 
well on the way to making out a case to be given the means. However, at the 
same time, the objectives (in the multilateral setting) must not be too specific 
– as is apparent in the case of the future post-2015 unique agenda. This 
leaves room for political maneuvering and can accommodate a range of 
somewhat different attitudes of donors. Their vagueness plays a significant 
role in political compromise. 
As stated by Easterly (2002), the environment which created aid bureau- 
cracies has led those organizations to define their output as money disbursed 
rather than service delivered and to engage in obfuscation, spin control, (for 
example, always describing aid efforts as “new and improved”) and amnesia 
so that there is little learning from the past. In Easterly’s opinion the heart-
breaking reality of aid isn’t so much that it didn’t work as that we in rich 
countries didn’t really care whether it did. 
This raises a related issue, namely the challenge of efficiently governing/ 
administering all the bodies and agencies of such a large international organi- 
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zation as the United Nations. While to some extent, a global development 
agenda acts as a broad overarching mission statement for all of its bodies, it 
would be rash to assume that all act as a team pursuing a collective common 
goal; a team being defined in the way suggested by Jacob Marschak (1955). 
In such a large organization both elements of competition and cooperative 
behavior are bound to exist. For example, to some extent, the bodies of the 
UN are in competition for its available funds and this can result in behaviors 
that are a drain on its resources. Apart from this, there are limits to the 
effective central management communication and organization in such a large 
organization. This can result in economic inefficiencies and provide some 
scope for rent-seeking by its agencies. To what extent improvements in the 
organization/administration of the UN could increase the effectiveness of the 
use of its available funding in promoting economic development is unclear, 
but it is a subject worthy of investigation.  
 
Differentiated Background and Experience 
There has been considerable criticism of the MDGs since 2000, and some of 
the more virulent criticisms are in fact not against the MDGs per se, but 
against the ideology of development (Easterly, 2007). Despite these criticisms, 
one can however consider that the MDGs have some merit, because they have 
been acted on worldwide and these goals have partly been reached. They do 
help target and monitor aid. In other words, this development agenda is not 
purely about theory; it exists in practice. It has been experimented with and 
this experience is valuable.  
Note that before the adoption of MDGs in 2000 by developed countries, 
Western countries had been engaged in development aid since the end of the 
Second World War. Until the end of the Cold War, in 1989, these policies 
consisted mainly of ODA. Since then the volume of aid from the private 
sector has greatly expanded. Therefore, the public as well as the private sec- 
tors of industrialized countries have had a quite long experience in develop- 
ment aid policies. 
Many – and especially the aid bureaucracy – consider the fact that the 
MDGs have been partially met as being meritorious. However, the fulfill- 
ment of these goals is not entirely due to foreign aid. For example, China’s 
development in recent decades did not rely on much foreign aid but its 
development (generated by its own economic reforms) made a big difference 
to the achievement of the global MDG goals. Likewise, some other low 
income countries achieved their MDG goals mainly as a result of influences 
other than foreign aid. Overall, the impact of aid on the partial achievement 
of MDG goals may have been miniscule compared to other factors, even if 
the aid bureaucracy might suggest otherwise. However, there may have been 
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indirect beneficial effects, e.g. suggesting desirable goals for governments and 
having them compare their development results with those of other countries. 
The international community has had an interest in sustainable develop- 
ment for several decades and this was strengthened by the first Earth Summit 
held in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro. Nevertheless, international agreements on 
topics related to SD have been hard to achieve, as was illustrated by the 
collapse of Copenhagen summit on climate change (held in December 2009). 
Moreover, when some international agreements on SD are finally reached, 
their implementation and enforcement are very difficult to obtain as is illus- 
trated by the Kyoto protocol7 adopted on December 1997 which placed a 
heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities.” In other words, many intentions, agreements 
and agendas are dedicated to SD but few of these are enforced and therefore 
the international community’s finds in that domain that achievements fall 
short of the MDGs. The real problem is that most people alive now are not 
prepared to make significant economic sacrifices to benefit future distant 
generations and/or do not consider it to be necessary. The motivations to 
increase current income via economic growth are very strong and given the 
nature and structure of our market system, this economic growth is needed to 
avoid growing unemployment (Tisdell, 1999, Ch. 6). Not many politicians 
want to slow economic growth to benefit distant generations. Furthermore, 
politicians choose between objectives relevant to sustainable development. 
For example, the CCP in China has chosen strong economic growth to pro- 
mote social (political stability) at the expense of environmental sustainability. 
Now it is saving some of its own environmental and natural resources by 
using those of other nations thereby adding to a global problem. This is what 
many developed countries did, however. 
The weakness of the SDGs agenda is clearly illustrated by the Rio 2012 
ideas on goals and indicators (UNCSD, 2012). In its report, the HLP itself 
recognized that “For twenty years, the international community has aspired 
to integrate the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustain- 
ability, but no country has yet achieved patterns of consumption and pro- 
duction that could sustain global prosperity in the coming decades” (United 
Nations, 2013, p. 8). 
 
PCD – Policy Coherence for Development 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, many commitments about 
policy coherence for development (PCD) have been made in various contexts. 
However, results have been modest, as governments in the North have found 
it difficult to go beyond their short-term political and economic interests. 
Indeed, poor outcomes are related to the widened agenda in international 
development and the domestic structures within individual countries. One may 
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also claim that the search for PCD is in fact an attempt to shift respon- 
sibilities from aid agencies to actors involved in other public policy areas 
affecting developing countries. 
      In relation to sustainability, it could be argued that many DACs are 
hypercritical. On the one hand, they provide some (but little) aid to slow 
deforestation in LDCs but at the same time, they engage in international 
trade8 that accelerates deforestation and which increases the amount of CO2 
in the atmosphere. The lack of policy coherence therefore also concerns the 
SDG agenda. 
 
Ends and Means: A Recurrent Discrepancy 
Both existing development agendas involve another weakness, namely the 
relative discrepancy between their goals and their means, i.e. the availability 
of enough finance to achieve their goals. This can be illustrated from the 
decision taken by the UN in 1970 (OECD/DAC, 2010) which set a goal for 
its higher income members to provide 0.7% of their GNP for development 
aid.9 Since 1970, this target has been continually reaffirmed by the UN and 
by leaders of countries and of international institutions. Even with the adoption 
of the MDGs in 2000 – in which goals are expressed in terms of result or 
impact and not in terms of means – “0.7” still refers to the repeated commit- 
ment of governments of rich countries to commit 0.7% of their GNP to ODA. 
However, except for a few Scandinavian countries, all the other countries 
have never reached this level of financing. In other words, the 0.7% target 
has never been met collectively (only 0.29% of GNI of all DAC was made 
available in 2012) (European Parliament, 2014, p. 16). This example is not 
isolated but is significant. It leads to a central question without a clear answer, 
and therefore to a central problem: is it credible to build a future unique 
development agenda with goals from two existing agendas in which the 
required funding has never been reached? 
 
5. Some Potential Shortcomings of  
    the Future Unique Post-2015 Development Agenda 
 
As claimed by the HLP itself, the unique post-2015 development agenda is 
based on five transformational shifts which can be illustrated by twelve main 
goals. In others words, even if there is a unique global agenda, it will include 
many goals, some being more related to the MDGs and the other being more 
related to SDGs.  
 
One Agenda, Many Goals 
While it is proposed to have one development agenda, questions arise about 
the relationships between these different goals (Hulme et al., 2015). Are they 
 86 
all consistent or not, and if they are consistent, are they complementary or 
substitutes and, if it is the latter, to what extent are they substitutes? Is there 
some form of competition among goals? This question is of great importance. 
Indeed, there are very few examples of economic sectors – except arguably 
ecotourism for instance – where proposed social goals are fully consistent, 
i.e. economic sectors which are able to create jobs and wealth in a competitive 
manner and to protect environment at the same time. Even for ecotourism, 
the results can be contentious. For example, rich eco-tourists often arrive by 
plane and outside the eco-tourist area have a negative environmental footprint. 
Sometimes projects designated as involving ecotourism only qualify in 
name. For instance, local people are removed to make way for ecotourism 
developments, e.g. the displacement of Bushmen (the !Kung) in Botswana. 
Even if some goals are consistent, it should be noted that correlation does 
not necessarily imply causality. If causality exists among goals, then some 
kind of ranking or hierarchy is needed between them. Agricultural policy can 
illustrate how such hierarchy emerges. If agricultural development is unsus- 
tainable, it may be possible to feed people (and thus contribute to reducing 
poverty) in the short-term but in the long-term, environments will be destroyed 
and poverty may increase again. Therefore, in order to reduce poverty in the 
long-term, it is necessary to have priority goals in the short-term, namely to 
concentrate efforts on sustainable agriculture. Here the causality is clearly 
from sustainable agriculture to the eradication of hunger and poverty. The 
extent to which sustainable agriculture is compatible with these goals is 
unclear. For example, is sustainable intensification of agriculture possible? 
The problem of causality is in fact much more important if we analyze in 
detail the various goals present in both agendas because some of them are 
final goals while others are intermediate goals – or preconditions. Indeed, the 
majority of the MDGs refer to improvements in the wellbeing of individuals, 
they are thus near final goals of human development (education, health, 
access to water) to be measured at the micro-level. The SDGs agenda also 
involves such goals (water, biodiversity), but also ones that refer to the 
preservation or establishment of global public goods (limiting deforestation, 
improving financial stability) that can thus only be measured at the macro-
level. The latter are not near final objectives, but preconditions for sustainable 
development. One can therefore wonder if it is consistent to put final goals 
and preconditions side by side in a single agenda? 
Proponents of an SDG agenda further criticize some aspects of the 
MDGs. They claim that the latter are generally short to medium-term and 
thus run counter to policies that are oriented towards sustainability, which 
necessarily have to be inherently longer-term focus. Moreover, they consider 
that central areas of sustainable policies – chiefly environmental objectives – 
are not reflected sufficiently in the MDGs. 
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Aid Effectiveness? 
During the last decades, many concerns10 have been raised about the effec- 
tiveness of aid. One main criticism is that aid delivery fails to give enough 
attention to the behavior of the recipients, e.g. the poor (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2012). A prime message of these authors is the need to empirically examine 
the behavior of the poor in order to devise policies that may assist them. The 
poor do not act in the way suggested by some stereotypes: e.g., supplying 
opportunities to the poor does not always result in the poor taking advantage 
of these opportunities. They point out that some measures of the delivery of 
benefits to the poor can be very misleading. An example is school enrolments. 
Enrolled students in developing countries often fail to attend school regularly, 
teachers often do likewise and may not teach when they are present, and so 
on. The situation is much more complicated than is realized. Therefore this 
approach does at the very least signify a significant shift in academic devel- 
opment economics. The agenda of this new literature can be summarized as 
follows: take one step at a time and make sure it is a positive step. As stated 
by Easterly (2005, p. 7): “I believe this shift in focus and ambition, which 
may have been an accidental consequence of the commitment to the RE 
(randomised evaluation) methodology, is actually a greater contribution to 
the development literature than the methodological one”. 
Another main criticism is the lack of coordination in donors’ policies. 
The latter reflects not only the lack of governance at the world level with 
respect to national aid policies but also the fragmentation of aid policy at the 
national level.11 Efforts of the international community to improve coordina- 
tion and aid effectiveness have led to the adoption of the Declaration of Paris 
(OECD, 2005) and to subsequent declarations at world summits held at 
Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). Despite these efforts, aid effectiveness has 
not really been improved. The main reason is that there is no division of labor 
among rich countries with respect to aid policies. With a unique development 
agenda, including numerous and varied goals, derived from MDGs and SDGs, 
one can wonder whether the coordination failures previously observed about 
aid policies are going to disappear or, on the contrary are going to be much 
more important. In other words, what will be the division of labor among 
countries – developed and developing ones – enabling the post-2015 develop- 
ment agenda to be successful? While all the transformational goals seem 
desirable, on closer analysis, they are somewhat vague,12 and this leaves 
their import rather open. Politically, this may be motivated by the desire to 
provide scope for compromise between the parties. 
Another central question is about the link between goals and related 
policies. Indeed, it is obvious that some goals are common to the MDGs and 
the SDGs, as illustrated for example by MDG 7. Both existing agendas are 
concerned about global challenges, i.e. they share the overlapping goals. 
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However, the interdependence between goals does not necessarily mean that 
a unique policy should be applied. In order to illustrate this claim, one can 
consider the analysis of economic growth in a simple economy. From the 
input-output analysis, it is possible to know the interdependence between 
key sectors such as agriculture and industry. We also know, at least from the 
Industrial Revolution, that this interdependence is at the core of economic 
growth. However, many countries have adopted not one but two separated 
policies, one for the agriculture sector and the other for the industry. Even if 
goals are common, they do not imply the implementation of the same policy. 
Foreign aid, on the one hand, and cooperation about GPGs on the other hand, 
need to be governed according to its own logic. In the case of development 
cooperation, the primary focus must be on the country context, and in the 
case of GPGs provisioning, it must be on the good whose provision level or 
shape is to be enhanced. 
 
Production of GPGs and Free Riding 
Following the seminal work of Samuelson (1954) on public goods,13 the 
notion of global public goods appeared sometime in the early 1990s in the 
context of global environmental issues (e.g. Nordhaus, 1994). GPGs are com- 
modities for which the cost of extending the service to an additional person 
is zero and for which it is impossible or expensive to exclude individuals 
from enjoying these. What is central about GPGs is that if some problems 
arise for them, there is no market or government mechanism that contains 
both political means and appropriate incentives to implement an efficient 
outcome. While the provision of global pure public goods can be a motive 
for aid, there is the problem of free riding. Indeed, in the conventional case, 
stemming from the original Samuelson 1954 model, the situation arises 
where the production of the GPGs is simply the sum of the contributions of 
the different producers. This is exemplified by global warming, where total 
emissions are equal to the sum of the emissions of different parties. In this 
additive case, efficient provision requires the familiar rule that everyone 
contribute to the point where private marginal cost equals social marginal 
benefit. Thus the additive case would provoke the standard syndrome of free 
riding and under-provision of the public good, with small and poor countries 
under-providing more than large and rich countries (Nordhaus, 2006). 
 
Aid policy: A Dilemma? 
Countries that are DAC members mostly claim that their aid policy is based 
on pure altruism. For instance, these countries commit to not tying the aid 
they provide to developing countries. However, such claims are dubious 
because even untied aid can be motivated by self-interest (see Section 2) and 
there still exist many examples of tied aid. Concerning the latter, often busi- 
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nesses in donor countries favor tied aid because it increases their chances of 
getting contracts. The same is true of domestic NGOs. Universities can also 
benefit. For example, scholarships for students from developing countries are 
usually only tenable in the donor country. The lion’s share of research monies 
for research projects in LDCs usually go to the nationals of the donating 
country.  
On the other side, the SDGs agenda necessitates a rapid shift to sustainable 
patterns of consumption and production, harnessing innovation, technology, 
and the potential of private business to create more value and drive sustain- 
able growth. Despite the stated aspirations of the international community in 
the last twenty years to bring about sustainable development behaviors, little 
has changed. The main problem is that companies’ strategies are profit-
oriented and that sustainable development is not yet (sufficiently) valued by 
markets. Moreover, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
as set out in principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, puts a heavier burden on rich 
countries and gives them incentives to behave in a non-cooperative manner, 
leading to sub-optimal outcomes. In order to encourage the shift towards a 
green economy, the governments of rich countries are therefore constrained 
to subsidize companies delivering foreign aid. With a unique development 
agenda, the rich countries are therefore potentially facing a dilemma. On the 
one hand, their aid policy is based on altruism and they condemn tied aid. 
On the other hand, they must provide fiscal incentives and subsidies to their 
firms to promote a global green economy. In the future, there may be a great 
temptation for any rich country to tie its aid given to poor countries, i.e. to 
mandate that this aid be spent on sustainable goods, services and technologies 
produced by firms of the donor country. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The creation of a single post-2015 global development agenda has merit if 
one believes that policies are best formulated in the context of rational 
decision-making models in which defined ends or objectives should be 
related to available means. From a deterministic point of view, the adequacy 
of such models depends on the objective being well defined, their means 
being identified and the consequences of utilizing means being adequately 
related to the ends. While the proposed post-2015 development agenda goes 
some way towards satisfying the conditions for rational choice (based on the 
type of model), it does not satisfy the conditions fully, as has been pointed 
out.  
Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that this is a failing. Not all scholars 
are convinced that the type of rational decision-making model involving a 
specific formulation of means and ends is in fact rational. Lindblom (1977; 
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1959) has persuasively argued that such an approach is not practical given 
social conflicts (requiring political compromises) and bounded rationality 
(Tisdell, 1981, pp. 15–17). Not only do the diverse priorities of nations have 
to be satisfied as far as global development policy is concerned but some 
flexibility in goals is needed to allow for changing circumstances including 
changes in public opinion. It can be concluded that by not fully satisfying the 
rational choice model, the proposed post-2015 global development agenda 
involves a sensible compromise between a tightly specified rational choice 
model and a more open-model for social choice.  
 
List of Notations 
CCP: Chinese Communist Party 
DAC: Development Assistance Committee 
GDGs: Global Public Goods 
HLP: High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons 
LDC: Least Developing Countries 
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals 
ODA: Official Development Assistance 
PCD: Policy Coherence for Development 
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals 
UN: United Nations 
UNCSD: United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 
 
NOTES 
 
1. For instance the OECD has started work on the paper series “OECD and Post-
2015 Reflections.” The series entails an overview paper and eleven elements 
(organized into two categories: outcomes, including principles and underlying future 
goals; and tools for achieving existing and developing future goals), each of which 
focuses on different areas that are crucial for the success of the post-2015 develop- 
ment agenda: http://www.oecd.org/dac/post-2015.htm#Current (Accessed October 
14, 2014). 
2. One notable exception is European Parliament (2014). 
3. As shown by the numerous discussions and controversies about the MDG 8 
devoted to the global partnership for development. 
4. E.g. the programme of the US for polio vaccination in Pakistan was a cover 
for spying. 
5. From 1999–2001 to 2008, the proportion of untied bilateral aid rose progres- 
sively from 46% to 82%. 
6. See the Introduction of the present paper. 
7. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and 
entered into force on 16 February 2005. The detailed rules for the implementation of 
the Protocol were adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2001, and are 
referred to as the “Marrakesh Accords.” Its first commitment period started in 2008 
and ended in 2012. 
 91 
8. For example, as pointed out by Tisdell (2011b) the EU imports palm oil for 
various purposes (e.g. production of biofuel in Germany) but this increases the 
demand for palm oil which accelerates deforestation, a result opposites to the recom- 
mendations of the United Nations Collaborative Program on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD 
Program). This program was created in September 2008 to assist developing coun- 
tries to build capacity to reduce emissions and to participate in a future REDD+ 
mechanism. For the purpose of this strategy, REDD+ refers to reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries. 
9. United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-Fifth Session, Second Committee: 
compare documents A/C.2/L.1104 of 25 September 1970 and A/C.2/L.1104/Rev.1 
of 14 October 1970. 
10. See e.g. Munro (2005), Andersen and Therkildsen (2012). 
11. It has been claimed that on average, any rich country had partnerships with 
about 100 developing countries. 
12. The twelve possible goals are rather more definite but many can be inter- 
preted differently. For example, views can differ about what constitutes good gover- 
nance, and the means for achieving these goals do not seem to be explored as yet. 
13. Public goods have the two key properties of non-rivalry and non-exclud- 
ability. However economists often refer to goods that do not fully meet the two 
criteria, but have significant public attributes, as “impure” public goods. Goods that 
are non-rival but excludable are often called “club goods,” and those that are non-
excludable but rival are called “common pool resources.” 
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